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Abstract 
We review five decades of takeover actively in the UK. We assess the relative 
characteristics  of  acquiring  and  acquired  companies  and  the  performance 
impacts of merger using both accounting and share price based measures. We 
conclude  that  the  fundamental  conclusions  reached  by  Ajit  Singh  about 
takeovers and the market for corporate control in his seminal contributions of 
the 1970s remain true in the light of subsequent work.  
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‘Insofar as the neoclassical postulate of profit maximization relies 
on  the  doctrine  of  economic  natural  selection  in  the  capital 
market (via the takeover mechanism) the empirical base for it is 




In this chapter we reflect on the contribution Ajit Singh has made to the study of 
takeovers  as  part  of  the  ‘natural  selection’  process  in  a  capitalist  market 
economy.  Our  emphasis  is  on  the  seminal  contributions  in  his  1971  book, 
Takeovers – Their Relevance to the Stock Market and the Theory of the Firm 
(Takeovers  hereafter),  and  his  subsequent  article  in  the  Economic  Journal 
(Singh,  1975).  We  consider  in  particular  whether  the  key  findings  and 
interpretations in these contributions have stood the test of time.  
 
The study of takeovers should be rooted in a specific institutional and historical 
context. We therefore concentrate solely, as Ajit did, on the UK, and consider 
only UK institutional and regulatory changes affecting the takeover process. 
There  is,  even  so,  a  substantial  subsequent  literature  (to  which  Ajit  himself 
contributed) spanning the three decades since the original book and article were 
published. In a chapter of this kind we are inevitably confined to an illustrative 
rather than exhaustive discussion.  
 
2. Takeovers 
Takeovers had its origins in 1963 and Ajit’s collaboration with Robin Marris 
and  Geoffrey  Whittington.  The  book’s  publication  was  delayed  by  the 
preparation of another book co-authored with Geoffrey Whittington, entitled 
Growth,  Profitability  and  Valuation  (Singh  and  Whittington,  1968).  As  Ajit 
wrote at the time of the publication of Takeovers, ‘A study of surviving firms 
took precedence over an examination of those which did not survive – it is a 
moot point whether this is a correct order of priorities.’  
 
The theoretical approach to the analysis in Takeovers is rooted in the theories of 
the firm proposed by William Baumol, Robin Marris and Oliver Williamson. 
These were linked to the 1930s work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means on the 
development of corporations with dispersed share ownership, and professional 
management  whose  motivations  did  not  necessarily  align  with  those  of  the 
shareholders.  A  pursuit  of  increased  size  for  reasons  of  personal 
aggrandizement  and  higher  rates  of  remuneration  would,  it  was  argued, 
predispose such companies to pursue size or growth at the expense of profits. In 
a  world  in  which  (following  Means)  there  was  limited  product  market 
competitive pressure, the role of disciplining managers and of aligning their   2 
decision-making with the welfare of shareholders would come to rest with the 
stock market. It would become a market for corporate control which selected 
the  fittest  companies  for  survival  (Manne,  1965).  Marris  in  particular, 
emphasized  takeovers  as  a  disciplinary  mechanism  constraining  managerial 
ambitions (Marris, 1964). 
 
In Takeovers Ajit developed a set of hypotheses characterizing the market for 
control  as  a  selection  mechanism  and  used  a  newly  constructed  data  set  of 
company accounts to test them. The latter was in itself a substantial intellectual 
effort,  carried  out  in  collaboration  with  Geoffrey  Whittington.  It  was 
subsequently developed and maintained through the efforts of Geoff Meeks, 
Joyce  Wheeler  and  others,  and  has  provided  a  rich  resource  for  many 
subsequent takeover studies. 
 
The empirical analysis in Takeovers seeks to compare, in turn, the performance 
characteristics of acquired companies relative to those companies that were not 
acquired; the characteristics of acquiring companies compared to the companies 
they acquire; and the characteristics of the acquiring companies compared to 
non-acquiring,  non-acquired  companies  and  companies  in  general.  It  also 
examines the impact of takeover on the subsequent performance of acquiring 
and acquired firms. In a market selection process ensuring stockholder welfare 
satisfaction  through  profit  maximizing  behaviour,  the  natural  selection 
hypotheses  are  that  acquiring  companies  will  be  superior  profitability 
performers, acquired companies will be inferior performers, and takeover will 
improve  profitability  performance.  Using  the  financial  accounts  for  several 
hundred UK public quoted companies, Takeovers contains both univariate and 
multivariate  analyses  of  the  short-  and  long-run  profit,  growth  and  other 
financial characteristics of acquiring and acquired companies relative to each 
other, and to other companies on the stock market. The analysis is notable for its 
careful discussion of problems of pooling takeovers from different time periods 
and  sectors,  and  for  the  care  taken  in  comparing  alternative  methods  of 
discriminating between groups of firms. Use is made of matched samples and of 
multiple discriminant analysis, with detailed checks of the robustness of the 
results (including, given the rather strong multivariate normality assumptions of 
the discriminant approach, some non-parametric checks). Analysing the impact 
of takeover on company performance raises the problem of the counterfactual of 
what  the  performance  would  have  been  in  the  absence  of  takeover.  The 
counterfactual devised has been used in many subsequent studies. It involves 
taking  the  weighted  combination  of  the  companies  involved  in  the  takeover 
relative to their sectoral performance and comparing it with the post-takeover 
performance of the merged company, again normalized by sector performance.  
   3 
The  principal  findings  of  the  analysis  in Takeovers  were  that  takeovers  had 
become the dominant form of corporate ‘death’; were becoming more intense 
over time; were, in contrast to the US, predominantly horizontal; and varied in 
intensity across industries and size classes. The likelihood of acquisitions in the 
largest size group was substantially lower and more strongly inversely related to 
company  size  than  in  the  smaller  size  groups.  Size,  rate  of  growth,  rate  of 
profitability and stock market valuation ratio were all lower for acquired firms 
relative to those firms that were not acquired. This is what might have been 
expected on the basis of natural selection arguments. However, and much more 
significantly,  the  analysis  showed  clearly  that  there  was  an  extremely  large 
overlap  between  the  acquired  and  non-acquired  firms  in  terms  of  these 
characteristics.  As  a  result,  the  ability  to  discriminate  successfully  between 
acquired and other firms was very low. Acquired and non-acquired companies, 
matched,  for  example,  by  size  and  industry,  revealed  very  little  difference 
between the groups. Where discrimination was successful, it tended to be in 
terms of short-run profitability, and in particular in terms of size. The overlap in 
characteristics  between  acquired  and  non-acquired  companies  increased 
between the period covered by Takeovers (1955–60) and that covered in the 
1975 article (1967–70). By the latter period, an attempt to classify companies 
into acquired and surviving groups based on profitability alone would have had 
a 46 per cent probability of misclassification. The fact that size was a better 
discriminator in both periods led to the somewhat perverse implication that the 
best  way  to  avoid  takeover  for  a  low  profitability  firm  was  not  to  increase 
profitability, but to grow, and that making takeovers may be the fastest way to 
do this.  
 
The  analysis  of  acquiring  companies  suggested  that  they  were  larger,  more 
dynamic  and  more  profitable  than  the  companies  they  acquired  (but  not 
necessarily  compared  to  non-acquired,  non-acquiring  companies).  Table  1 
shows a selection of results drawn from the 1975 Economic Journal article, 
which includes key results from Takeovers.  
 
The table shows that the most statistically significant difference is to be found 
when size is used as a discriminating variable. Profitability is significant only in 
the first of the two periods. The short-term change in profitability is, however, 
significant in the later period (the analysis was not carried out for the earlier 
years). A further detailed analysis reveals a considerable overlap between the 
acquired and acquiring companies, but the results provides some comfort for the 
proponents of a natural selection argument. However, when the impact of the 
takeover  on  performance  is  assessed,  a  disappointing  result  emerges.  The 
impact on pre-tax profitability, in the period 1955–60, for example, shows that 
in the first year after takeover, 66 per cent of the firms have a worse post-  4 
takeover performance when compared with the combined target and acquiring 
firm pre-takeover relative to industry profitability. Two years afterwards, 57 per 
cent have a worse takeover performance, and after three years, 77 per cent have 
a  worse  takeover  performance.  This  outcome  is  not  consistent  with  the 
prediction of the selection models.  
 
Table 1. Differences between acquired and acquiring companies, 1955–60 and 1967–70 
 
1955–60  1967–70 
Variable  d/s  t-statistics  d/s  t-statistics 
Size (logarithms)  -1.50*  -10.60  -1.35*  -6.21 
2-year average 
profitability  -0.41*  -2.93  -0.29  -1.33 
Growth  -0.69*  -4.91  -0.35  -1.60 
2-year change in 
profitability  n.a.  n.a.  -0.70*  -3.20 
 
Notes: * Significance level: 1%;d is the difference in the means of the acquired and 
acquiring group, and s is the estimated common standard deviation. A minus sign for d/s 
indicates that acquired firms had a mean value below acquiring firms. Source: Singh 
(1975). 
 
In  addition  to  these  central  findings  the  analysis  in  Takeovers  included  an 
examination of a number of topics that became important issues in later research. 
Thus the analysis also looked at the extent to which takeovers led to executive 
dismissals,  which  might  be  deemed  to  be  consistent  with  the  selection 
mechanism.  It  revealed  little  difference  in  executive  retention  between 
successful and unsuccessful acquired firms. The analysis also contrasted hostile 
with friendly takeovers, again as a particular variant of the selection model, and 
found few differences between them.  
 
As a result of these findings taken as a whole, Ajit concluded that the empirical 
basis for the takeover natural selection argument was very weak (Singh, 1975, p. 
514).  
 
We shall now examine how far these results and conclusions have stood the test 
of time. 
 
3. Takeovers since Takeovers 
3.1 The changing context of takeovers 
There  have  been  significant  changes  since  the  1960s  in  both  the  nature  of 
takeovers and the institutional framework in which they have occurred. Figures   5 
1 and 2 show that takeovers have continued to occur in significant waves. The 
scale of these waves has, however, increased, as has the internationalization of 
the takeovers made by UK public companies. Figure 3 shows that the nature of 
share  ownership  has  also  changed  dramatically.  From  the  mid-1950s  to  the 
1970s steady growth occurred in the importance of institutional investors as 
holders of UK equity, at the expense of individual shareholders. The decline of 
individuals as shareholders has continued unabated since the mid-1960s. What 
is most striking in Figure 3, however, is the major increase in overseas share 
ownership. The result has been that, from the early 1990s, the shares of UK 
institutional  shareholders  and  pension  funds  have  fallen.  The 
internationalization of share ownership may potentially alter the extent to which 
shareholder interests are both perceived and acted upon by investors. To the 
extent  that  overseas  investors  (consisting  of  a  mix  of  individuals,  overseas 
sovereign funds and overseas institutional investors) bring with them different 
attitudes to the nature of shareholder company relationships, then so too may 
the  nature  of  the  takeover  process  change.  Equally,  to  the  extent  that 
collaborating action is more difficult to undertake when investors are spread 
internationally, the role of ‘voices’ may be diminished. 
 
 
Figure 1 The growth and internationalization of takeovers: the number of domestic and 










































































































Source: Calculated from Office of National Statistics data. 
 
 
Figure 2 The growth and internationalization of takeovers: the value of domestic and 
overseas acquisitions by UK acquirers, 1969–2006 (stock market prices, 2006) 



























































































































































Rest of the world Insurance companies Pension funds
Individuals Investment and Unit Trust and 
Other Financial Institutions
Banks, Charities, Public Sector and 
Private Non-Financial Companies  
Source: ONS (2007) Share ownership: A Report on Ownership of Shares  




These developments have been accompanied by a decline in the incidence of 
public quoted company status. Figure 4 shows that the number of UK quoted 
companies has fallen, from almost 4,000 in the mid-1960s to fewer than 1,500   7 
by the start of the twenty-first century. The number of international companies 
has remained more or less constant over this period. This trend is connected 
with the increasing importance of UK corporate reorganization via buy-outs, 
buy-ins and private equity takeovers that has led to the conversion of public 
companies to private status. By the start of the twenty-first century, between 20 
per cent and 50 per cent of the value of total buy-out and buy-in activity was 
concerned  with  the  conversion  from  public  to  private  status  (Wright  et  al., 
2006).  
 
Figure  4.  The  fall  and  fall  of  UK  quoted  companies:  numbers  of  quoted  UK  and 
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Source: Stock Exchange historical statistics. 
 
 
These major changes in the characteristics of the UK stock market, and the 
takeover  process,  has  occurred  at  the  same  time  as  major  changes  in  the 
regulatory  framework  affecting  the  takeover  process.  These  changes  have 
reflected dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of traditional forms of corporate 
governance in terms of board structure and function, and of the exercise of 
‘voice’  and  other  direct  activity  by  shareholders.  They  have  also  been 
fundamentally concerned with the operation of the takeover process itself.  
 
These changes are reviewed in the context of governance and takeovers more 
generally in Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2007) ‘UK Corporate Governance and 
Takeover Performance’  
 
A  succession  of  reports  in  the  1990s  led  to  the  construction  by  2003  of  a 
combined code on corporate governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2003). 
The  latest  (2006)  version  of  this  combined  code  imposes  obligations  on   8 
institutional shareholders to take a responsible and active role in relation to the 
companies whose shares they own. In terms of board composition and board 
operations,  the  combined  code  emphasizes  the  need  for  a  single  board  with 
collective responsibilities and a standard-setting role with a clear division of 
responsibilities between chairman and chief executive. In addition, at least 50 
per cent of board members for larger corporates should be independent, non-
executive directors. It also established procedures governing the evaluation of 
board  effectiveness,  the  appointment  of  directors,  and  for  setting  executive 
remuneration and long-term incentive schemes. Remuneration is to be linked 
clearly  to  performance.  An  audit  committee  of  independent  directors  with 
sufficient experience will be responsible for presenting a balanced assessment 
of the company’s position and maintaining internal control procedures.
1 The 
most recent report, in 2007, which has a bearing on these issues was related in 
particular  to  private  equity  firms  and  the  need  for  transparency  in  their 
operations (Walker, 2007).  
 
At  the  same  time  as  these  persistent  attempts  to  improve  internal  board 
government structures and the relationship between key external investors and 
the  board,  there  has  been  the  development  of  the  City  Takeover  Code  to 
regulate the actual process of takeover itself. The City Code on Takeovers and 
the operation of the Takeovers Panel, which enforces it in the UK, has been 
designed essentially to protect shareholders’ interests and preserve an active 
market for corporate control. The focus is on shareholders alone and does not 
involve any discussion of wider stakeholder issues. The principal focus is on the 
equal treatment of stockholders. In particular, all bidders and shareholders are to 
be  treated  equally  in  relation  to  information  and  the  timing  of  its  release. 
Actions to frustrate bids that do not have shareholders’ approval are particularly 
frowned upon. 
 
While neither the Combined Code nor the Takeovers Panel operate with the 
force of law, their close links with requirements for stock market listing and 
accepted behaviour has meant that they have in effect come to dominate the 
practice of behaviour in these two  areas.  The rationale behind the approach 
adopted by the Takeover Code is implicitly, if not explicitly, that the orderly 
workings of the market for corporate control through takeovers are an essential 
part of the operation of the capital market and that they should be free to operate 
in as unhindered a way as possible in the interests of shareholders. One might 
expect that the emergence of the Code into a dominant position would have 
influenced  the  extent  to  which  takeovers  occurred  in  the  interests  of 
shareholders,  and  that  this  would  reinforce  the  kinds  of  regulatory  changes 
associated with the adoption of the combined governance code (Cosh et al., 
2007).    9 
 
3.2 Pre-takeover  characteristics 
Hughes  (1993)  reviews  thirteen  studies  that  investigated  the  pre-takeover 
characteristics  of  acquired  companies  in  the  UK.  These  studies  covered  the 
period 1955 to 1986.
2 He concluded that acquired companies are always less 
dynamic pre-merger than control group companies, even if the difference is not 
always statistically significant. In relation to pre-takeover profitability, however, 
he concluded in particular that the differences between the acquired and control 
group or acquiring companies are minimized in periods of merger boom, when 
the  groups  become  virtually  indistinguishable.  Moreover,  where  profitability 
differences do distinguish the acquired from the rest, it is in terms of short-term 
profitability in the years immediately preceding acquisition or declines in profit 
performance  in  those  periods.  In  virtually  all  studies,  size  is  a  significant 
distinguishing characteristic of acquired versus acquiring companies. Acquiring 
companies  are  always  larger  than  acquired  companies.  However,  it  is  also 
apparent that the liability to acquisition of medium-sized to larger companies 
increases in merger booms.  
 
In terms of post-takeover performance Hughes reviewed six studies of changes 
in accounting performance as a result of takeover, and fourteen studies reporting 
event  study  share  return  effects,  or  matched  control  group  comparisons  of 
measures  of  shareholder  return  based  on  capital  gains  and  dividends.
3 The 
typical  results  using  accounting  studies  and  the  Singh  counterfactual  and 
showing post-takeover falls are shown in Table 2.  
 
Hughes concludes that there is evidence for improvements in profitability only 
in the case of diversifying mergers, but taken as a whole and in the case of 
horizontal  acquisitions  as  a  group,  the  impact  on  profitability  is  of  a  small 
variable, but negative movement in profitability in the post-merger compared to 
the pre-merger period. The studies focusing on short-term announcement effects 
on share returns show that any short-run gains for acquirers are outweighed by 
longer-term  post-takeover  losses.  This  is  consistent  with  bids  launched  by 
acquirers with ‘overvalued’ stock. There is some evidence that the combined 
short-run share price effects on acquirers and acquired company shareholders 
are positive or neutral because the targets receive substantial bid premiums. 
However, even the combined effects become negative in the longer term. He 
concludes that taken as a whole these studies suggest that acquirers launch their 
bids when their prices are relatively high (either by accident or by design). They 
also show that whatever positive short-term effects are associated with bids in 
the  longer-run  they  are  followed  by  cumulatively  negative  effects  on  the 
acquirers’ shareholder performance. 
   10 


























t + 3  164  -0.06**  52.7  241  -0.08*  61† 
t + 5  67  -0.11**  64.2†  186  -0.06  60† 
 
(3) Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh 
1981–3 
1-year profitability                   Lower   n.s. 
3-year profitability                   Lower   n.s. 
Change in profitability                        Lower   sig. (10%) 
 
Notes: † Significantly different from 50% at the 5% level. * Significantly different from the 
zero at the 5% level. ** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
a Net income/net 
assets.  
Source: Hughes (1993).  
 
There have been ten studies published since 1991, attempting to distinguish UK 
acquired companies from surviving companies.
4 They span the period 1948–96. 
Some of these studies have been carried out using similar methods to those 
described  in  Takeovers,  but  others  involve  using  hazard  function  estimation 
procedures as well as probit and logit analysis, rather than discriminant analysis. 
They include the full range of financial variables considered in Takeovers, as 
well  as some share  return variables. The studies include several attempts  to 
establish whether the profitability characteristics of firms subject to hostile bids 
were different from those subject to friendly bids.  
 
In general, the results of these studies are supportive of the key findings of the 
results reported in Takeovers. In particular, attempts to discriminate in terms of 
rate of return between acquired companies and the rest, which use logit and 
probit approaches, find extremely poorly estimated models with very low rates 
of  successful  classification  (Powell,  1997;  Thompson,  1997;  Barnes,  1999). 
Similarly, univariate comparisons of pre-takeover share returns or profitability 
show  no  significant  differences  between  acquired  companies  and  the  rest 
(Franks and Mayer, 1996; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Cosh and Guest, 2001). 
The exception to these findings is Nuttall (1999a) who reports in an analysis of 
643 UK quoted companies in the period 1989–96 that Tobin’s q and the return 
on  sales  is  statistically  significantly  negatively  related  to  the  probability  of   11 
acquisition.  He  does  not,  however,  report  on  the  probabilities  of 
misclassification arising from this analysis.  
 
Regarding the question of hostility, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) report no 
difference  in  pre-takeover  share  returns  between  disciplinary  and  non-
disciplinary bids, and Powell (1997) similarly finds no difference between the 
profitability characteristics of hostile and friendly targets. This result is echoed 
in Franks and Mayer (1996) and Cosh and Guest (2001). While Cosh and Guest 
(2001) report no pre-takeover differences in profitability between hostile and 
friendly targets and various control groups, they do report a significant fall in 
short-term  profitability  in  hostile  takeovers  compared  to  control  groups  and 
friendly acquisitions in the year before the acquisition takes place. This analysis 
covering the period 1985–96 is consistent with the finding in Singh’s original 
studies  that  short-term  profitability  falls  may  be  related  more  closely  to  the 
acquisition probability than the average on medium-term rates of return before 
takeover. Cosh and Guest also report that the share return performance in the 
year before acquisition in hostile targets was significantly worse than for control 
groups and friendly targets, which reinforces this implication.  
 
All the studies considered report that size is negatively related to the probability 
of takeover. The incidence of takeover declines with the size of the firm. In 
some periods, however, this may be non-linear,  with the  highest acquisition 
rates in medium-sized companies (see, for example, Dickerson et al., 2002). In 
general, however, greater size is related to a lower likelihood of acquisition. 
There is some evidence that larger companies are more likely to be subject to 
hostile takeovers, though, as we have seen, this is not related to their profit 
performance (see, for example, Powell, 1997).  
 
All the studies referred to so far have used either univariate comparisons or 
logit/probit models, which are closely related to the approach based on multiple 
discriminate analysis that Singh used in his original work on takeovers. In an 
interesting series of studies, however, an alternative estimation procedure has 
been used. These are the studies by Dickerson and colleagues, who examined 
the period from 1948 to 1990, making use of an updated version of the original 
Singh/Whittington data set.  
 
In Dickerson et al. (1998) a discrete time analogue of the Cox proportional 
continuous  time  hazard  function  is  estimated.  Thus,  given  that  a  firm  has 
survived up to any point in the data period, the method estimates the impact that 
a  change  in,  say,  size  or  profitability  will  have  in  terms  of  a  change  in  its 
probability of takeover. They estimate this function for 2,839 UK non-financial 
companies in the time period 1948–70. While size is included as a variable   12 
affecting  the  conditional  probability  of  acquisition  along  with  measures  of 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, investment, dividends and industry dummies, 
they do not report the change in conditional probability associated with changes 
in size. They do report, however, that higher dividends and higher investment 
both  reduce  significantly  the  conditional  probability  of  takeover,  with  the 
impact of dividends being higher than that for investment in new assets. Since 
investment can increase the size of a company, they combine the total elasticity 
of investment and size, and show that it is only one-third as large as the effect of 
dividends. They conclude that the allocation of a marginal £1 of earnings by 
managers  seeking  to  avoid  acquisition  would  be  to  issue  them  in  dividends 
rather than investing in assets. They do not regard these as being a trade-off 
between shareholder and manager interests, since this depends on the impact of 
investment of the future returns.  
 
Dickerson  et  al.  (2002)  extended  the  analysis  to  the  period  1970–91.  This 
analysis covered 323 acquisitions in a sample of 892 UK-quoted companies. 
Using hazard function and probit analysis, they found that higher profitability, 
investment and dividends reduced the probability of takeover. In contrast to 
their findings for 1948–70, the impact of dividends is not always statistically 
significant. In the period after 1982 the impact of a change in profitability on 
the probability of being acquired was much lower. Their overall conclusion was 
that shareholders focus primarily on current profitability. These findings, using 
different  estimation  methods  and  including  later  time  periods,  confirm  the 
important point in Singh’s original work that short-run changes appear to have a 
much  greater  impact  than  longer-run  or  average  effects,  and  confirm  more 
generally the earlier results using univariate methods summarized in Hughes 
(1993).  
 
Singh’s further argument that a firm’s best way to avoid acquisition is to grow 
through acquisition itself receives strong support in Dickerson et al. (2003). 
They showed that making a previous acquisition has a negative impact on the 
probability  of  subsequently  being  acquired.  In  the  period  1948–70,  the 
probability of subsequently being acquired fell by 27 per cent, and in the period 
1975–90 it fell by 32 per cent. This effect, they argued, is mainly because of the 
impact of the increase in size following acquisition.  
 
3.3 Post-takeover performance  
Twenty-eight studies of the impact of acquisition on performance in the UK 
have been published since 1990,
5 covering takeovers occurring in the period 
1948–2004. A wide range of performance variables was used in these studies. 
There  is,  however,  a  broad  distinction  between  those  performance  analyses 
based on share price effects and those that focus on accounting returns.    13 
 
There is a wide variation in the detail with which the share price effects are 
estimated. This is a result of the protracted discussions in the finance literature 
of the relevant benchmark to use when calculating whether the share returns 
experienced by a company are above what might have been expected. The other 
important distinction in share price studies is between those studies that focus 
on very short-term effects in time windows of a few days around merger events, 
and those that examine longer-run effects in the post-merger period (which can 
cover a period of up to 36 months, and occasionally longer). It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to include a detailed discussion of the niceties of these 
alternative counterfactual estimates. There is a similar issue dealing with the 
appropriate  accounting  rate  of  return  to  use.  This  has  also  generated  a 
distinctive methodological sub-literature, which is reviewed in recent studies of 
UK takeovers (see, for example, Conn et al., 2005); Powell and Stark, 2005; 
and Cosh et al., 2006).  
 
If  we  focus  on  the  returns  experienced  by  the  shareholders  of  acquiring 
companies,  a  fairly  straightforward  conclusion  emerges.  The  announcement 
effects  of  takeover  are  bad  for  acquiring  company  shareholders:  they  most 
frequently lose wealth (Conn and Connell, 1990; Limmack, 1991; Sudarsanam 
et al., 1996; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Sudarsanam and Maharte, 2003; Bild et 
al.  ,2005;  Conn  et  al.,  2005;  Cosh  et  al.,  2006),  or,  in  a  few  studies,  are 
apparently made no worse off (Higson and Elliott, 1998; Cosh and Guest, 2001; 
Gregory and McCorriston, 2005; and Antoniou et al., 2007). No studies have 
reported positive effects.  
 
If we turn now to long-run post-takeover share performance, another gloomy 
picture emerges. There is some evidence that, in some time periods, long-run 
positive impacts can occur. Thus, for example, Higson and Elliott (1998) show 
significantly negative long-run returns to acquirers in the periods 1975–80 and 
1985–90, but positive returns in the period 1981–4. Negative long-run share 
impacts over 12 to 36 months after the bid period are reported for acquiring 
companies in Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997), 
Sudarsanam  and  Mahate  (2003),  Conn  et  al.  (2005)  (though  for  private 
acquisitions  the  negative  effect  is  statistically  insignificant),  Gregory  and 
McCorriston (2005) (though the decline is insignificantly different from zero), 
Alexandridis et al. (2006), Antoniou et al. (2006) (although the declines are 
statistically  insignificant),  Cosh  et  al.  (2006),  Antoniou  et  al.  (2007)  and 
Antoniou et al. (2008) . This is not a very happy story for the proponents of the 
view  that  the  stock  market  selection  process  yields  improvement  in  stock 
market performance as a result of the acquisition activity.  
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The studies of accounting performance as opposed to shareholder performance 
are more mixed. Approaches using variants of the original Singh normalization 
procedure typically find significantly negative impacts on most definitions of 
profitability. Negative impacts are found in Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) for the 
period 1977–84, but insignificantly positive effects for the period 1984–90 one 
year after the takeover is considered. They argue that the latter effects may 
reflect exploitation of changes in accounting standards in the mid1980s. Cosh et 
al.  (1998)  carried  out  a  detailed  study of  profitability  effects,  correcting  for 
possible  selection  bias  in  the  allocation  of  companies  into  acquiring  and 
acquired groups and allowing for regression to the norm in terms of profitability. 
They found that the normal tendency for profits to regress towards the mean 
was  reinforced  in  the  case  of  merging  firms.  Acquisition  produces  a 
deterioration in post-merger profitability compared to pre-merger profitability, 
which is faster than would be expected. Powell and Stark (2005), in a careful 
study  of  a  variety  of  accounting  measures  and  using  results  that  allow 
alternatively for regression to the mean, or compare differences in normalized 
levels using the Singh procedures, find differences in results depending on the 
method and measure used. Thus, their analysis, covering the period 1985–93, 
shows significant improvement in operating performance in regression based 
models. These  effects are  weaker for pure cash flow  measures compared to 
accruals-based measures. Analyses using Singh normalized rates of return show 
improvements  that  are  lower  than  the  regression  model  and  are  typically 
insignificantly different from zero. Bild et al., studying 303 acquisitions in the 
UK over the period 1985–96 find that the post-takeover profitability on equity is 
significantly higher in the takeover year and each of the three years afterwards 
compared to controls. Cosh et al. (2006) in a detailed analysis of 363 UK public 
non-financial takeovers in the period 1985–96 provide an analysis of multiple 
accounting  return  measures  and  compare  regression  and  normalized 
counterfactuals.  They  concluded  that  there  is  a  significantly  positive  impact 
when operating profit returns are used, but an insignificantly positive impact 
when post-takeover cash flow returns are used.  
 
A  number  of  the  accounting  studies  have  touched  on  the  issue  of  hostile 
compared to non-hostile bids. Cosh and Guest (2001), in their study of sixty-
five  hostile  and  139  friendly  takeovers  in  the  period  1985–96  show  that 
profitability  increases  significantly  post-merger  in  hostile  takeovers,  but  that 
there is no significant change in friendly takeovers. The difference in the returns 
between these two groups is also statistically significant. This is consistent with 
a more positive interpretation of the market for corporate control, and achieves 
some  support  from  those  long-run  share  price  studies  that  have  tried  to 
distinguish between hostile and other takeovers. Thus Sudarsanam et al. (1996), 
Gregory (1997) and Higson and Elliott (1998) reported positive or less negative   15 
effects  for  hostile  than  other  acquirers.  Gregory  and  McCorriston  (2005) 
reported no impact for hostility nor, despite their findings of significant profit 
differences between hostile and friendly takeovers, did Cosh and Guest (2001) 
find relatively improved share price performance in hostile takeovers. In fact 
they  found  insignificant  negative  declines  in  long-run  returns  for  hostile 
takeovers combined with significantly negative returns for friendly takeovers. 
This is unrelated to the pre-acquisition performance of the target.  
 
Taken as a whole, these results suggest that, in the short run, the shareholders of 
acquiring companies suffer significant wealth losses as a result of takeover. The 
bulk  of  the  results  also  show  that  further  long-run  significant  losses  in 
shareholder wealth occur after the takeover has occurred. This does not suggest 
that there would be strong incentive effects for the shareholders of acquiring 
companies  to  encourage  a  process  in  which  their  managers  are  seen  as  the 
vanguard  of  a  selection  process  to  weed  out  inefficient  firms.  Acquisition 
simply makes them worse off. 
 
If we focus instead on profit returns based on accounting data as a proxy for 
efficiency we find a much more mixed picture, which is clouded from the mid-
1980s  onwards  by  the  possibility  of  accounting  conventions  distorting  the 
results. For takeovers before then, Dickerson et al. (1997) may act as an overall 
summary.  They  analysed  1,143  acquisitions  by  613  acquirers  in  the  period 
1948–77 and showed that acquisition has a significantly negative impact on 
profitability. The effect was a 4.07 percentage-point fall on average from the 
mean rate of return across all non-acquiring companies (the average being 16.45 
per cent). In other  words, there was a  25 per cent fall in  profitability post-
takeover.  Dickerson  et  al.  also  report  that  these  negative  impacts  were 
worsening over time and were much higher in the 1964–77 period than between 
1948 and 1963.  
 
So far, we have focused on acquisitions as single events. It is possible to argue 
that  pooling  together  firms  who  make  multiple  acquisitions  with  firms  that 
make a single acquisition may mask important differences between the two. 
Significant organizational learning effects may mean subsequent takeovers will 
yield better performance for the shareholders of the acquiring company than 
those earlier in the series. Cosh et al. (2004) tested this hypothesis for 1,486 
merger series covering 3,019 public and private acquisitions, of which only 805 
involved a single acquisition. They show, by using both long-run share return 
and profit rate measures, that there is a steady deterioration in performance until 
the series ends in shareholder wealth losses.  
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Taking these studies as a whole we conclude that support for the idea that a 
selection  process  may  be  at  work  is  strongest  in  the  findings  of  profit 
improvements for hostile as opposed to friendly takeovers, but even these hold 
only for some time periods and some measures. However,, acquiring company 
shareholders generally lose wealth no matter what the type of takeover.  
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
Our  interpretation  of  the  work  that  has  been  carried  out  on  UK  takeovers 
subsequent to Ajit Singh’s seminal studies is simple. Singh’s initial insight that 
the  stock  market  was  a  very  imperfect  vehicle  through  which  the  natural 
selection  process  could  be  carried  out  has  been  supported  substantially  by 
subsequent work. This is most striking in relation to the inability to distinguish 
acquired companies from the rest in terms of their underlying profit or share 
price performance. Equally, there is very little evidence to support the view that 
the  shareholders  of  acquiring  companies  should  be  motivated  to  support 
management who wish to carry out takeovers, on the grounds that they were 
extending  their  superior  management  skills  to  underperforming  companies. 
Both the short-run and long-run share price impacts suggest that takeovers, on 
average,  substantially  worsen  acquiring  company  shareholders’  wealth.  The 
evidence on profit impacts have become somewhat more positive over time, but 
depend critically on whether the period is before or after the major accounting 
standards  changes  affecting  takeovers,  and  on  whether  cash  flow  or  other 
methods of profit measurement are used.  
 
The takeover process as a whole seems to be characterized more easily in terms 
of  either  the  pursuit  of  managerial  self-interest  or  in  terms  of  the  hubris 
hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986): ‘If there really are no aggregate gains in 
takeover, the phenomenon depends on the overbearing presumption of bidders 
that their valuation is correct … there is little reason to expect that a particular 
individual bidder will refrain from bidding because he has learned from his own 
past errors’ (p. 200). 
 
Of course, it may be the case (as the current authors have heard argued in each 
successive  takeover  wave  that  has  occurred)  that  the  latest  wave  will  be 
different from those preceding it. Lessons will have been learnt, and the nature 
of the takeover process will have changed. In terms of regulatory reform and 
change,  it  does  not  seem  as  though  the  nature  of  the  process  has  changed 
dramatically  despite  the  extent  of  changes  we  have  noted  in  this  chapter. 
Nevertheless, the latest version of the ‘hope-springs-eternal’ argument is to be 
found in claims at the time of writing that the role of private equity in the latest 
wave will show substantial gains from takeover. One of the virtues of proposing 
this view while a wave is in progress is that it is difficult to evaluate the claims,   17 
because the current wave is invariably not the one that features in the current 
academic literature. This is partly an effect of the lags in the publication of 
academic results, but also of the need to allow a number of years to pass to 
enable the estimation of post-merger performance effects. It remains to be seen 
whether in five or ten years’ time, when the dust has settled on the private 
equity boom, whether the conclusions that Ajit Singh drew in his original work 
will remain true. We repeat those conclusions and endorse them here: ‘insofar 
as the neoclassical postulate of profit maximization relies on the doctrine of 
economic natural selection in the capital market (via the takeover mechanism) 
the empirical base for it is very weak’ (Singh, 1975, p. 954).   18 
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